endorsements, and intensively lobbied governments, intergovernmental organizations, and the International Olympic Committee (IOC). In a world of proliferating human rights abuses, HRW has made human rights at the Olympics a magnet for the finite resources and attention of many human rights organizations. Although tangible improvements in human rights outcomes are, as always, hard to measure, such campaigns have unquestionably worked to popularize ideas of human rights among a broad global audience. The infiltration of human rights into sports events is a prime example of how all-encompassing and ambitious the human rights 'industry' has grown since its origins in the 1960s fighting for political prisoners.
This article offers the first analysis of a key shift: how and why the human rights community, and Human Rights Watch in particular, moved from indifference to engagement on the human rights effects of the Olympic Games, placing international sport on the agenda of global human rights movements for decades to come. The roots of human rights pressures on sports megaevents have been little studied. Scholars of human rights have ignored international sport, while scholars of international sport have only recently begun to attend to human rights. 3 The few accounts that discuss the origins of the linkage assume a long genealogy, dating to the 1936 'Nazi'
Olympics. 4 As this article shows, however, the link was established in popular consciousness only in 1993, when HRW played a significant role in creating it. 5 It was in 1993 that HRW chose to mount a major campaign against Beijing's bid to host the 2000 Olympic Games. The effort seems to have swayed the narrow vote that awarded the event to Sydney instead of Beijing. It also turned the bidding, as one journalist put it, into 'the most highly publicized battle to host the Games ever seen in the history of the modern Olympic movement'. story of Western anxieties about the rise of China and the recasting of human rights after the Cold War. It had large unintended and negative consequences for Sino-American relations, and though it spurred popular enthusiasm for human rights in the West, it did so in a way that suggested that punishing abusers would achieve results, when the opposite may have been true in this case. The
Olympic campaign resurrected familiar narratives about dissidents, but brought them to new, untapped audiences, opening up a vast new terrain for human rights activism. 7 The collapse of communist rule in Eastern Europe in 1989 (and then in the USSR in 1991) coincided with a very different outcome in communist China, where the regime sent tanks into Tiananmen Square to crush a student-led pro-democracy movement -while the world watched, horrified, on television.
Hundreds of demonstrators were killed and thousands arrested. China suddenly drew prime attention from human rights groups. framed claims more often in terms of equality and anti-racism rather than under the umbrella of universal human rights. and translating a biography into Chinese. 23 'We look upon the International Olympic Committee as God', the bid committee's head told the official People's Daily. 'Their wish is our command'. 24 As one observer put it, the competition for the millennium Games 'broke all records' for 'intensity and emotion'. 25 In the relatively free-wheeling days before the 1998 Salt Lake City votebuying scandal led to reform, all the bid committees poured resources into their efforts, planning infrastructure and facilities for a massive event and cultivating stakeholders with favors and, in effect, bribes. (Manchester's bid chairman commented that he knew 'the shoe size of the second daughter' of one IOC member. 26 ) The four bidding cities outside China spent $154 million combined. Even in this overheated atmosphere, Beijing's efforts stood out. Whereas the Sydney bid committee peaked at about 50 staffers, the Beijing bid committee reportedly had three hundred.
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Noting that on the day of the IOC vote the Beijing Daily ran no fewer than eight front-page stories on the bid, the Associated Press described the bid as 'a relentless international campaign' unparalleled since Deng Xiaoping had begun to open China to the outside world 15 years ago. 28 The regime treated the IOC vote as a referendum on China's status as a great power. When the IOC inspection committee toured Beijing, factories were closed to reduce pollution, high school students and soldiers washed and painted the lane dividers on Beijing streets, and every taxi sported an Olympic sticker. For months, the city was festooned with banners, and the Olympic bid cropped up in everything from culinary competitions to a drive to rid the city of flies. 29 Chinese officials even promised they would inscribe the names of IOC members on the Great Wall. 30 It is not surprising that China was unprepared for the human rights outcry its Olympic bid provoked. Though Western democracies had imposed sanctions on the PRC after the Tiananmen Square massacre, China's booming economy gave the country considerable leverage. The West's desire for China's cooperation in the 1990-1991 First Gulf War provided still more. By 1993, the PRC had already shaken off most of the sanctions imposed after 1989. 31 There had never been a major, orchestrated human rights campaign around a hosting bid, and the Chinese regime 'Nazi' Olympics. 34 UK Foreign Minister Douglas Hurd declared that Beijing would be a 'bad choice'. 35 International human rights groups used the opportunity to generate publicity for their own reporting on China; thus, for example, the International Commission of Jurists issued a report on China's human rights record in June 1993 that urged the IOC not to ignore abuses. 36 The Londonbased human rights behemoth Amnesty International, constrained by its reluctance to advocate sanctions, took a quiet and only implicitly oppositional approach. 41 But these groups struggled to be heard. Thanks to HRW's preexisting clout and credibility, its views were the ones the media covered.
HRW's campaign succeeded in popularizing a proposition that till then had failed to gain traction: the Olympic Games should be responsible for broad-based human rights promotion well beyond the sports arena. As HRW staff attorney Richard Dicker told the press: 'It's way past due….
We want to change the attitude that this is sports and it has nothing to do with politics'. HRW's case against the bid was underpinned by the conviction that universal human rights were now firmly established as a global moral standard, and as such, they should apply to everyone, including China and the Olympic Games. Impatience courses through many of HRW's statements:
it was time for human rights. Bernstein wrote that rights had attained fundamental importance in the world today, so 'it is past time' that they be part of the Olympic Games. As Deputy Director
Kenneth Roth put it in April, the world was now 'freed from the highly charged political considerations of the Cold War', so the IOC 'can and should' now take human rights into consideration. 68 A Washington Post editorial illustrated this brand of human rights triumphalism:
'This is 1993. The world is changing. Large-scale systemic human rights violations are incompatible with the conduct of a nation seeking status as a late-20 th century Olympics host'. 69 How should the Olympics include human rights? HRW urged the IOC to give its members full reports on the human rights situations in prospective host countries -not only passing along the information already compiled in human rights reports by HRW, Amnesty International, and the U.S. State Department, but also doing its own investigations and writing its own human rights reports. 70 The suggestion must have struck the aristocrats, sports administrators, and former athletes who filled the IOC as ludicrous: there could be few bodies less well equipped to monitor human rights conditions than this corrupt and autocratic club.
In keeping with HRW's practice of calling for sanctions to punish human rights violators, the organization argued that giving the Games to Beijing was wrong because it would 'reward' China for repression. It pushed the idea that hosting a major event had to be 'earned'; countries had to 'deserve' it. Respect for human rights should be a consideration for the IOC, HRW argued, 'so that especially abusive governments are not rewarded.' As Dicker put it: 'If the IOC awards Beijing the Games, it will send a clear and dangerous message to the Chinese leadership: Your human rights practices are good enough for us'. 71 Finally, HRW used emotional appeals to paint China's continuing repression as a kind of arrogance toward the West. Dicker, for example, characterized Chinese statements about a lack of opposition to the bid within China as 'astounding' and 'boast[ful]'. 72 Referring to Chen Xitong's appointment, Dicker claimed: 'Here you have a country that just four years ago horrified the world with its human rights policies…. The fellow who was out greeting the IOC delegates when they visited Beijing is the same fellow who was in no small part responsible for the events at Tiananmen.
That is so insensitive, that is so arrogant, it is astounding.' 73 What did HRW mean by human rights? Unlike Amnesty International, with its still quite narrow mandate, HRW monitored an expansive range of civil and political rights. In its Olympic campaign, however, the violations it decried related only to detention and maltreatment of dissidents. When it gave examples, it cited the Tiananmen Square events and the arrests, imprisonment, and torture of men who opposed the communist dictatorship. The selection of abuses was deliberate. As Dicker explains, the idea was to keep the public eye on the consequences that continued to flow from the 1989 massacre. 74 The group's early commitment to target Turkey and Brazil alongside China was quickly dropped (Brasilia dropped out in early August), and the campaign became not a general human rights effort but, as HRW described it, a 'serious effort' to 'stop China from getting the Olympic Games'. 75 The group struggled to link human rights to Olympic ideals. Like the Chinese, HRW could find no mention of human rights in the Olympic Charter. Peace and international goodwill were too vague to pulled into service as prohibitions on political imprisonment. But HRW paid homage to the Olympic mythology with references to 'Olympic values' and 'the Olympic spirit'. Writing to the IOC and the U.S. Olympic Committee, for example, Bernstein cited Olympic ideals as reason to oppose the bid: 'Holding the Olympics in a country known for imprisonment for the mere expression of ideas…flies in the face of the Olympic Spirit'. 76 Stepping onto shakier ground, HRW also argued that China practiced discrimination 'on the basis of political ideas' that should be considered a violation of the Charter's ban on discrimination. 77 As Dicker recalls, it was not so much that the IOC made claims that could be leveraged to support human rights promotion but that its own self-portrayal as 'loftier than the angels in heaven' made it vulnerable to moral claims.
HRW's position dovetailed with the aims of the Sydney bid organizers, who were desperate to undermine Beijing without violating the tradition that bidding cities do not criticize rivals. Peter
Woolcott, the head of international relations for the Sydney bid, explained: 'China's human rights record was seen as a significant weak spot for them, and how to play this issue was very much part of the committee's thinking about appropriate strategies. The themes around the Sydney bid were set up, in part, as a counterpoint to Beijing's claims -the emphasis was on the environmental, the friendly, the fresh and the bold, and images associated with democratic virtues'. 79 As worries about affairs. 81 Sino-American relations hit their lowest point since 1972. In 1993-94, China's military began planning for a possible war with the United States, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff began to think in the same terms toward China. As a Pentagon official put it, 'Both sides, in effect, [were] finding the other a convenient substitute for the Soviet Union as an enemy'. 82 Congruent with its broader human rights stance, the administration tried, unsubtly, to undermine Beijing's Olympic bid. When the IOC reluctantly conceded that human rights should be a factor in awarding the Games, the State Department applauded the statement and pointedly noted that China's record was deficient. As a spokesman put it, the Department 'communicated its views' to U.S. IOC member Anita DeFrantz by providing her with its 1993 human rights reports on potential hosts. 83 Though claiming it took 'no view' on which city should get the Games, the administration admitted that sending DeFrantz the human rights reports was aimed at China. 84 The executive branch also offered tacit support to the legislative branch's much less restrained opposition. 85 In July the House overwhelmingly passed a resolution sponsored by 94 In 1993 its response to hundreds of similar letters about Beijing was more mollifying: by May, with media pressure intensifying, it was assuring writers that human rights would be a factor in the vote. 95 Deeply concerned as Congress became restive, the IOC hired a lobbyist to work with the U.S. Olympic Committee to head off Congressional challenges on human rights front. Their 'strong defensive effort' succeeded in watering down the actions in both House and Senate. In the House, the lobbyists secured the deletion of language urging the IOC in general to vote against Beijing, instead directing the appeal only to the U.S. IOC member. In the Senate, the lobbying succeeded in downgrading a proposed resolution to a much less significant letter -all on the grounds that the perception of 'political interference' would harm the Olympics. 96 Samaranch, like many others in the IOC's leadership, professed to believe that China's staging of the Games would lead to reforms. 97 In the week before the IOC vote, the Chinese, in a fit of nerves, belatedly adopted a more conciliatory stance on human rights. The government released three jailed dissidents and invited a
French human rights group to visit imprisoned dissidents. The bid committee's spokesman, Wu
Jianmin, who had previously made his statements in Chinese by reading from notes, gave an impassioned, apparently heartfelt statement in fluent English. 'It's not fair', he said. 'The Chinese government cares a lot about human rights', citing the country's success in feeding and providing jobs for its booming population. Asked about HRW's claims that the government was waiting till after the vote to put more dissidents on trial, he denied the charge so angrily that he had to apologize for his outburst. 101 It was too little, too late.
HRW seemed happy to accept credit for stopping Beijing's 2000 bid. 108 The next year, its report looking back on human rights in China in 1993 began by noting that 'international concern' over China's human rights abuses had derailed its attempt to host the Olympics. 109 The group's persistence, wedded to its credibility on human rights, may well have convinced a few IOC members that a Beijing Games in 2000 would provoke too much of a media firestorm. 110 After investing so much political capital in the bid, China experienced the loss as a major political setback. Many Chinese, from the bid committee to ordinary citizens, saw the defeat as a humiliation and the United States as the spoiler that had taken aim at China out of fear and envy of its rising power. For months the media had given substantial attention to the opposition in the U. 114 we are not opposed a priori to China getting the Games' because media attention might lead to greater openness. When asked about its change of heart, the group explained that because the 2000
Games marked the new millennium, they had special symbolic significance, and that awarding them to China so soon after the Tiananmen Square massacre would have been inappropriate. Yet HRW specifically denied that China's human rights record had improved since the last bid. 116 No doubt HRW correctly judged that China was unlikely to be voted down a second time and that an oppositional stance would diminish its capacity to press for reforms before and during the Games. Partly, too, the PRC was now willing to address human rights concerns; in the oral bid presentation to the IOC voting session, for example, China's representative claimed that the Olympics would help the development of human rights. 117 HRW also decided that the most effective strategy for addressing a sport-minded audience was not outright condemnation but an optimistic, feel-good approach, one that played to sport fans' conviction that sport was a force for good. As one HRW official explained, 'we didn't want to rain on the parade'. global politics, as historian Jan Eckel has suggested, but also when the United States dominated a lobbying the U.S. government directly, the campaign married HRW's moral standing to U.S.
power.
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HRW's campaigns around sports mega-events have been significant for both the Olympic Games and human rights. By accepting Olympic enthusiasts' claims that the Games are a force for good, HRW has lent legitimacy to the IOC as a moral actor at a time when it is facing serious challenges on other grounds, including the enormous costs of hosting the Games. Today human rights are the most prominent rubric for framing moral claims around international sport. Moral pressures on sports mega-events, once grounded in issues rooted in the sports competitions themselves, have spilled over at a dizzying pace into areas with no obvious connection to sport.
Human rights advocacy groups now pressure international sports competitions to promote basic freedoms (of press, speech and religion), judicial reform, and fair employment practices in countries hosting the events. Although many sports fans probably remain indifferent to the cause, the media spotlight on the Olympics reaches such an enormous audience that it would be hard to argue that there has been any arena of contestation over human rights that has had more widespread publicity.
Yet the 1993 Beijing story should make us cautious about campaigns with emotionally appealing slogans that mask major moral and political complexities. There are no sure methods for righting human rights abuses, nor does the international community agree on a universal set of priorities for ranking the multiplicity of rights, so punishing or shaming Olympic hosts and host candidates on human rights grounds offers no guarantee that benefits will result -and it may dispose us to forget that the mind-boggling sums spent on each transient event may well constitute the most significant human cost of the Games. Risks, too, should be considered: human rights pressures, unless managed very deftly, may on balance produce long-term harm in the form of lasting resentments and a heightened threat of international conflict. 121 In the view of critics like Stephen Hopgood, this marriage has had dangerous consequences. As Hopgood writes, 'Human Rights Watch's real legitimacy comes from proximity to American power, American money, and American values. This is no kind of legitimacy at all outside the United States'. S. Hopgood, 'Peter 
